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Sammendrag 
I 2005 overførte over 8 prosent av norske aksjonærer sine aksjer til nye skattely (holdingselskaper 
etter overgangsregel E), i den lovlige hensikt å utsette beskatning av kapitalgevinster og utbytte som 
ellers ville være skattepliktig etter skattereformen i 2006. Ved hjelp av detaljerte administrative data 
identifiserer vi familienettverk og beskriver hvordan opprettelsen av slike skattely sprer seg innenfor 
nettverk. Reformen innebar at muligheten til å sette opp skattely endret seg diskontinuerlig rundt en 
eierandel i virksomheten på 10 prosent, og vi bruker dette til å estimere effekten av tilgjengeligheten 
av skatteunngåelse for en skatteyter på skatteunngåelsen til andre personer i nettverket. Vi finner at 
opprettelse av skattely i nettverket, øker andre nettverksmedlemmers tilbøyelighet til å opprette 
skattely. Dette antyder at skatteytere påvirker hverandres beslutninger om skatteunngåelse, og 
understreker betydningen av å ta hensyn til sosiale samspillseffekter når vi skal drive tilsyn og forstå 
skatteyteres atferd. 
 
 
1 Introduction
The standard public ﬁnance approach to analyzing tax-inﬂuenced economic decisions presumes a
well-informed taxpayer who makes rational decisions while understanding the important features of
the economic environment. This paradigm has long been considered non-satisfactory in the context
of tax evasion, where the standard Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model overpredicts the extent
of cheating (see Andreoni et al., 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002, for surveys of the literature).
Recent work also recognizes that empirical behavioral responses are sometimes puzzlingly small and
inconsistent across diﬀerent contexts  for example, Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven
and Waseem (2013) show that elasticities implied by the number of taxpayers who are bunching
at the kinks of income tax schedule are very small, Chetty et al. (2009) and Finkelstein (2009)
show evidence consistent with salience of tax incentives playing a role, Jones (2012) shows that
taxpayers do not adjust withholding to reduce refunds, Chetty et al. (2014) show that only a small
number of taxpayers makes active saving decisions, and a large literature shows the importance of
default options in retirement programs (Madrian and Shea, 2001, and the literature that followed)1
and imperfect take-up of social beneﬁts (Currie, 2006).
The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence regarding a particular class of
explanations for tax-motivated behavior. We are interested in testing whether the decision to
pursue tax-minimizing behavior spreads within social networks, and in particular, family networks.2
We ﬁnd evidence that this is so. Our research design leverages the presence of a discontinuity in
taxpayer's eligibility for setting up a particular (legal) tax shelter. We show that this discontinuity
aﬀects own tax avoidance and then we establish that it also aﬀects tax avoidance of taxpayers in
the family network who are not on the margin. In other words, similar taxpayers who have similar
family networks, pursue diﬀerent decisions as the result of a slight diﬀerence in characteristics of
one of their family members that discontinuously change availability of avoidance for that family
member (rather than the individual itself). We interpret this evidence as providing a concrete
example of an optimization friction (driven by characteristics of the network) that is responsible for
generating heterogeneity in taxpayer behavior with real tax consequences.
One potential direction for reconciling theory and evidence on non-compliance is to provide
a more realistic characterization of the economic environment. This is what recent work on tax
compliance has done by pointing out to the importance of third-party reporting (Kleven et al., 2011),
attachment to the ﬁnancial sector (Gordon and Li, 2009) or arms-length transactions (Kopczuk and
Slemrod, 2006) as factors limiting the extent of evasion. While this strand of work suggests that
administrative environment plays very important role in tax compliance, it does not fully account for
the empirical patterns that suggest that taxpayers who face seemingly similar circumstances often
make diﬀerent tax decisions. Indeed, in the strongest piece of evidence so far on the importance of
1Also, see Duﬂo and Saez (2003) for evidence about the role of social interactions in retirement planning, and
Dahl et al. (2014) for social interactions in the takeup of welfare beneﬁts.
2When analyzing how behavior spreads within social networks, there is a variety of networks to choose from, such
as family, collegues, schools, sports, church attendance, shareholders, accountants, board members, neighbourhoods,
etc. In this paper, we focus on a particular and natural choice of an exogenous network: family members.
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third party reporting, Kleven et al. (2011) ﬁnd that while accounting for third party reporting is
extremely important for understanding patterns of compliance, only about 40% of taxpayers who
are able to cheat do so.
Beyond attempts to improve characterization of the incentives faced by individuals, the recent
development is to postulate an existence of optimization frictions that may stop individuals from
pursuing otherwise optimal tax adjustments (e.g., Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, 2012; Kleven and
Waseem, 2013). This is a useful abstraction that potentially allows for explaining inconsistencies
in observed empirical patterns, but it encompasses many possibilities: optimization frictions may be
due to behavioral biases, lack of information, monetary or time adjustment costs or non-standard
preferences. These varying possibilities might have very diﬀerent policy implications so that discrim-
inating between them is very important. Furthermore, there are two related, but distinct reasons
to consider frictions. On one hand, one may be interested in developing a better understanding of
individual behavior. On the other hand, frictions are a potential source of heterogeneity in behavior
in the population. Our evidence about relevance of social interactions in the tax avoidance context
provides evidence for both of these lines of thinking: for networks to matter, individual optimiza-
tion has to depend on their characteristics; at the same time, by their very nature, networks are
heterogeneous and hence generate diﬀerences in behavior of otherwise similar individuals.
Empirical work on tax avoidance and evasion faces a lot of challenges due to diﬃculty in observing
the outcomes (pursuing and extent of tax avoidance/evasion). We can sidestep this problem due to
existence of a well-deﬁned tax shelter that is observable in our data; we provide more details below.
Approximately 8% of Norwegian ﬁrm owners adopted this particular tax shelter during the second
half of 2005. We can also observe the precise timing of adoption and hence analyze its dynamics.
The existence of this well-deﬁned measure of tax avoidance allows us to overcome measurement
issues and focus instead on determinants of pursuing of this type behavior. The particular reform
that we analyze introduced discontinuity in opportunities to set up this shelter that we exploit
through the regression discontinuity design. Our data allows for constructing full family networks
that we can then use to identify spillover eﬀects.
To our knowledge, the only other (and concurrent to this work) paper that uses family relations
to study the eﬀect of norms and social interactions on the participation in tax minimization is
Frimmel et al. (2018). They use Austrian data on claimed commuter tax deductions, where they
can actually check the commuting distance and determine whether the deduction was rightfully or
wrongfully claimed, the latter constituting tax evasion. They study father-child pairs and ﬁnd that
tax evasion runs in the family. Where Frimmel et al. study the intergenerational transmission of
illegal tax evasion behavior, we study how legal tax avoidance behavior spreads within broad family
networks.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe Norwegian tax policy and
the reform that gives rise to the research design in this paper and in section 3 we describe our data.
Section 4 is devoted to the empirical strategy. Our main reduced form results are in Section 5,
where we present regression discontinuity based evidence of the eﬀect of the 10% rule that is the
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source of the discontinuity on individual take up, followed by demonstrating the spillover eﬀect in
the network. In Section 6 we show the corroborating eﬀect of timing and conclude that the take up
in the network accelerates overall take up. Conclusions are in the ﬁnal section.
2 The 2006 reform and tax sheltering opportunities
Under the Norwegian dual income tax in eﬀect as of 1992, capital gains realized by both individuals
and corporations were subject to the basic tax rate of 28% (that applied also to corporate, capital
and labor income). Dividends were tax exempt on both individual and corporate levels.3
The Shareholder Income tax was ﬁrst proposed by an advisory committee on February 6, 2003.
A revised version was presented by the government on March 26, 2004, and sanctioned by the
Parliament on June 11, 2004, to be introduced on January 1, 2006. The Shareholder Income
Tax ensures equal tax treatment of all personal owners of corporations, independent of ownership
composition. It levies a tax of 28 percent on all personal shareholders' income from shares, including
both dividends and capital gains.4 During the transition, the tax on realized capital gains on shares
for corporate shareholders was removed eﬀective 3/26/2004.5 Subsequently, taxes on dividends for
personal shareholders were introduced eﬀective as of 1/1/2006. Hence, pre-2004, corporate capital
gains and dividends were treated in the same way as individual ones; as of March 2004 corporate
capital gains were privileged relative to individual ones and in 2006 both capital gains and dividends
on the corporate level were treated favorably relative to individual ones. As the result, these changes
unambiguously strengthened the incentive to own shares in a ﬁrm through another entity rather
than directly. Indirect ownership in general allows for separating two decisions: extracting resources
from a ﬁrm and the ultimate transfer to the individual. Such a separation can have non-tax beneﬁts
to the owners such as shielding personal assets from third parties (creditors, family members) in a
holding company, as well as tax-related beneﬁts such as tax-free consumption within a (holding) ﬁrm
without bearing the economic risk associated with the activity of the original ﬁrm (see Alstadsæter
3This structure provided incentives for income shifting toward capital income tax base and to prevent it, the split
model (1992-2005) imputed a return to the owners' labor eﬀort in the ﬁrm, which was taxed as wage income. The
split model applied to sole proprietors and corporations with 2/3 or more of shares held by active owners or where
active owners were entitled to 2/3 or more of dividends. The split model and the incentives for income shifting are
analyzed by Lindhe et al. (2004), Alstadsæter (2007) and Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2010).
4The risk-free return to the share, the so-called Rate-of-Return-Allowance (RRA), is tax exempt. If received
dividends are less than the RRA, the remaining amount is added to the imputation basis of the share for the
calculation of future RRAs. The unused RRA is carried forward and added to the imputed RRA in the following
year. The share-speciﬁc RRA cannot be transferred between diﬀerent types of shares and only owner at the end
of the year beneﬁts from the calculated RRA for that year. Dividends paid to corporations were tax exempt at
the introduction of the model, as were corporations' capital gains from realization of shares. Sørensen (2005) and
Alstadsæter and Fjærli (2009) provide more information on the Shareholder Income tax.
5This exemption of capital gains from taxation was implemented without warning on March 26, 2004. Anecdotal
evidence that this was not expected by the business community, is the fact that one of the nation's richer investors
on March 25, 2004 sold shares in a corporation that he owned indirectly through his investment company. Christian
Sveeas' investment company Kistefoss sold its 6.5 % stake in the online price comparing service Kelkoo to Yahoo on
March 25, 2004. This resulted in a taxable capital gain of 235 Million NOK, and capital gains taxes of 63 Million
NOK or appr. 10 million USD. Had this sales contract been signed one day later, the capital gain would be tax
exempt.
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et al., 2014, for evidence of this type of tax planning), and arbitrage between personal and corporate
taxation. Following the reform, exempting capital gains and dividends for corporate owners creates
an additional and very important advantage due to deferral of taxation. From our point of view,
the key point is that individuals have a stronger incentive to own ﬁrms indirectly after the reform;
we of course ﬁnd prima facie evidence of it being so due to the massive conversions that took place.
For the existing ﬁrms, switching from direct (individual) to indirect (holding company) owner-
ship should in principle require transferring/sale of existing shares and would trigger tax liability. In
order to level the playing ﬁeld between individual and corporate investors, the so-called Transition
Rule E was introduced, which under certain conditions enabled an individual to transfer his/her
shares in an existing ﬁrm to a holding company during 2005 without triggering capital gains tax
that would otherwise be due. The Transition Rule E was ﬁrst proposed on November 19, 2004,
and sanctioned on December 10, 2004. It removed capital gains tax liability when an individual
shareholder transfers all his shares in a ﬁrm to a newly founded corporation, given that this new
holding company in the end holds at least 90% of the shares in the transferred company and the
compensation is in the form of shares in the new corporation. The new holding corporation had to
be founded and report sent to the company register by Dec. 31, 2005. It turned out that this tran-
sition rule was restrictive and relatively few shareholders could utilize it, and a more liberal version
of the Transition Rule E was proposed on May 13, 2005, and later sanctioned on June 17. Under
this new version of the Transition Rule E, the 90% threshold was reduced to 10%  to qualify, the
holding company has to hold at least 10% ownership stake in the transferred corporation. Taking
advantage of the Rule required that all shares that an individual owns must be transferred, and that
the compensation is in the form of shares in the holding corporation. The transfer or foundation
must be reported to the Corporate Register by Dec. 31, 2005. We will refer to a holding corporation
that was founded during 2005 in response to the transition rule E as a tax shelter or an E-ﬁrm.
To summarize: prior to 2004, the incentive to own corporations directly was fairly strong because
corporate capital gains were subject to taxation (thereby resulting in multiple layers of taxation
before reaching personal owners), while dividends were tax exempt in any case. As of March 2004,
neither corporate capital gains nor dividends were subject to the tax. As a result, indirect ownership
of a ﬁrm allowed for deferral of taxation of capital gains until the holding company is sold. The
incentive for indirect ownership was signiﬁcantly strengthened by the introduction of individual-
level dividend taxation as of 1/1/2006. For the existing ownership stakes, taking advantage of these
deferral opportunities should in principle require realizing capital gains and triggering tax liability,
but the Transition E rule provided an opportunity to convert to indirect ownership without the tax.
The main purpose of holding companies set up under Transition E rule appears to be to work as a
tax shelter intended to defer taxation and alternatives to achieve the same outcome would be costly.
During 2005, 16,483 holding corporations were set up and approximately 9% of existing non-listed
ﬁrms at the end of 2004 had at least some of the owners electing to transfer their stake to a holding
company.6
6Statistics Norway identiﬁed new holding corporations set up under the transition rule E by an existing sector
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Figure 1 shows the timing of adoption of ﬁrms that we classiﬁed as being set up under the
transition rule. As the ﬁgure demonstrates, setting up holding companies was not uniform over
time. Adoption was slow at the very beginning and increased rapidly toward the end of 2005, just
before the opportunity to take advantage of it expired.
3 Dataset description
We use very detailed administrative data covering the universe of Norwegian ﬁrms, individuals and
shareholders. Every resident in Norway is provided a unique personal identiﬁer that is present in
all databases, enabling us to follow every individual over time and across datasets. The same holds
for ﬁrms.
The Shareholder Register7 contains records of every shareholder of every Norwegian corporation
for 2004-2008. Relying on the shareholders register, we are able to identify for each person and
ﬁrm their holdings and, correspondingly, for each ﬁrm its owners, whether they are corporate or
individual. Relying on this dataset, we select individual shareholders in 2004 who resided in Norway,
owned shares of a Norwegian non-listed corporation with less than 100 individual owners and are
not sole proprietors.8 In particular, we can also identify holding companies that were set up during
2005 through the sector code assigned to them by Statistics Norway, determine their ownership
structure and holdings. Because we observe this information for a number of subsequent years, we
can also trace changes in the ownership structure such as transfers of an existing ﬁrm to a holding
company. Importantly for our analysis, we know the exact date when each ﬁrm (holding companies
included) was registered. The resulting sample consists of 318,818 personal shareholders at the end
of 2004.
Using other register information we are able to link other characteristics, both demographic
(gender, age, marital status, immigrant status, education) and economic (including tax-related
information such as gross and taxable income, dividend income, capital gains realizations).
To estimate the eﬀect of a tax shelter being set up in shareholder i 's network on the likelihood
that the shareholder himself adopts a tax shelter, we need to make operational a deﬁnition of the
code that was rarely used: NACE-code 65.238 Portfolio Investments. A shareholder is deﬁned to set up a tax shelter
(Transition rule E) if in 2005 he is an owner of a corporation with NACE-code 65.238 that was founded during 2005,
and that in 2005 owns shares in a non-listed corporation in which the physical shareholder held at least 1% shares in
2004. At the beginning of 2005, there were a total of 1886 existing corporations with NAC E-code 65.238, and during
2005, 16483 new ﬁrms with this code were set up. 8.2% of all our sample of shareholders in 2004 set up a tax shelter
(E-holding) in 2005. As the NACE-code 65.238 is an existing code, some of these new ﬁrms might be founded for
other reasons than tax sheltering (i.e. utilization of Transition rule E). Due to the low number of ﬁrms in this group
at the beginning of 2005 error should be small.
7More on this data source in Statistics Norway, Share Statistics, 2006, http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/
11/01/aksjer_en/.
8We can also follow indirect ownership  via other ﬁrms  but we opted to not use it for our 2004 running
variable (ownership share) because each individual owner of such a pre-existing holding company may not have full
control over shares and thus may not be in a position to take advantage of the E-ﬁrm rule. Correspondingly, allocating
shares owned by a ﬁrm to its owners is likely to be somewhat arbitrary and introduce noise in the running variable.
Having individuals below the 10% mark also owning shares through individual channels is one possible explanation
for signiﬁcant take up for individuals who were not eligible in 2004.
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network. In this paper, we focus on a particular and natural choice of an exogenous network:
family members. To do so, we identify the following family members of each shareholder in our
2004 sample: parents; grandparents; children (born in 2004 or earlier); children's spouse (married
2004 or cohabitant with common children); grandchildren; spouse (married as of 2004 or cohabitant
with common children 2004); spouse's siblings; spouse's children (born in 2004 or earlier); spouse's
parents; siblings; siblings' spouses (married as of 2004 or cohabitant with common children); siblings'
children (born in 2004 or earlier); siblings' parents; aunts/uncles; aunts/uncles' spouses; cousins. In
other words, the family network of an individual is assumed to include his direct (parents, children,
siblings, spouse) relatives and direct relatives of the direct relatives.9
4 Basic Framework
Our core econometric framework consists of two equations  for the individual i and the network
member j that may potentially aﬀect her
Ej = αj + βj ·Xj + γjZj + µj (1)
Ei = αi + βi ·Xj + γiZi + µi (2)
Equation 1 relates sheltering decision E to one's own incentives represented by Xj , and control-
ling for own characteristics Zj  this is the ﬁrst stage. Equation 2 relates sheltering decision of an
individual to his own characteristics Zi and some characteristics Xj of the network member. In most
cases we will use a dummy variable for setting up a tax shelter as the dependent variable and esti-
mate speciﬁcations as linear probability model. Given that we will primarily focus on local eﬀects
in small (bounded) neighborhoods of the discontinuity point, this is not particularly restrictive. We
will also occasionally investigate the timing of decisions by replacing E with adoption of the shelter
in some period τ, Eτ , or using the timing of adoption t directly. Some of these speciﬁcations will
be estimated using tobit and probit methods to address censoring (not everybody adopts before the
deadline) or accommodate periods with very low adoption rates.
In the Appendix A, we provide a simple theoretical framework for interpreting βi and βj . The
non-zero value of βi implies that the social interactions are present. Its value provides an indication
of the magnitude of the eﬀect that is not structural  it measures the responsiveness to the
particular shock. Remark 3 (under assumptions leading up to it), provides a way to guide the
interpretation of their ratio βiβj  βi being large relative to βj indicates that either the interactions
are very strong or that the awareness of sheltering opportunities of the family members that are
inﬂuenced by the recipients of the shock is relatively low.
The most restrictive feature of our estimation equation may seem to be due to the fact that
we include Xj for only a single other individual  we will discuss the interpretation below. As
9We will usually exclude the spouse from the network because the relevant unit of observation may be a household
rather than an individual but the results are robust to this restriction.
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mentioned before, we implement a regression discontinuity design that relies on the feature of the
reform that required a newly set-up holding company to own at least 10% of shares of a ﬁrm.
Hence, an individual who already owns 10% of shares in a ﬁrm was in a position to pursue this path
with no additional adjustments while individual who owned just below 10% would have to either
buy or coordinate with others. Consequently, we deﬁne Xj = 1(Sj ≥ 0.1) where Sj is individual
shareholding in a ﬁrm. Crucially, we have information about the exact number of shares that an
individual owns in 2004 as well as the total number of shares in a ﬁrm so that we can (1) construct
Sj exactly and (2) do so using information that precedes the reform and hence does not reﬂect the
eﬀect of the reform itself.
Our basic comparison is that of individuals just below and just above the 10% threshold. The
ﬁrst stage corresponds to equation 1. While, as we stated in Remark 2, the response of the individual
to this incentive is not a necessary condition for the presence of network eﬀects, a combination of
the lack of such evidence with the presence of network eﬀects would certainly be surprising. The
ﬁrst stage is important for a number of other reasons. First, we will investigate subsamples with
diﬀerent propensities to set up an E-ﬁrm and expect that those where the direct eﬀect is strongest
are also likely to exhibit stronger network eﬀects. Second, our attempts to provide a structural
interpretation of the estimates rely on comparison of direct and indirect eﬀects. Figure 2 suggests
that individuals with ownership stake smaller than 10% as of 2010 were less likely to ultimately take
advantage of the Transition E rule. In particular, there is evidence of a (statistically signiﬁcant)
discontinuity at the 10% threshold that we will exploit in our regression discontinuity design. We
will return to details involved in constructing this ﬁgure below.
Equation 2 is the second stage. The decision of an individual is related to incentives (Xj) of
his network member. Hence, the comparison is between individuals who happen to have in their
networks somebody with just over 10% shares in a ﬁrm versus those that have in their networks
somebody with just under 10% shares.
There are many characteristics of individual and the network that may matter as well in general.
The regression discontinuity design allows to abstract from them as long as they do not change
discretely at the 10% threshold. We will investigate this assumption for particular variables and
will test sensitivity of results to including controls. Assuming that the assumptions for validity
of RD hold, controlling for such additional characteristics is not necessary for obtaining unbiased
estimates of the eﬀect of Xj .
We will investigate heterogeneity of the response by splitting the sample along some dimensions
(such as history of reliance on dividends) and/or including interaction eﬀects.
We also note that since any operationally available deﬁnition of a network is intrinsically arbi-
trary, our measure of the presence of a tax shelter within the network will not be fully correct if we
do not properly classify individuals as members of a network. Thus, estimates of β may suﬀer from
the attenuation bias if what one is interested is the eﬀect of any interactions. As long as assumptions
for the validity of RD hold, the estimates reﬂect though the average eﬀect of exposure to sheltering
in a family network. While a concern in general, the downward bias due to mis-classiﬁcation makes
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our task harder, but should not lead to spurious ﬁndings.
4.1 Unit of observation
Our running variable is deﬁned on the level of shareholding. A shareholding in a particular ﬁrm k of
a particular individual j may or may not be eligible for establishing an E-ﬁrm depending on whether
it corresponds to less or more than 10% share. Any individual may have multiple shareholdings
in multiple ﬁrms that may fall on either side of the threshold. We want to avoid assumptions
necessary to aggregate such information to the individual level. This is because aggregation disposes
of potentially useful information and comes with practical concerns.
For example, using instead the largest share owned by a taxpayer in any ﬁrm is also a continuous
variable to which the 10% discontinuity applies, but it ignores all smaller shareholdings that also
correspond to discontinuous incentives and it turns out to correspond to a small sample size around
the 10% threshold (i.e., some taxpayers who own around 10% of a ﬁrm also turn out to own a higher
share of some other ﬁrm). Various forms of averaging are incompatible with regression discontinuity
design because they blur the running variable, so that there is no longer discontinuity in incentives
of such a measure (i.e., at 10% of average shareholding).
Hence, instead, we usually represent our data on the shareholding level. That is, we are treating
each (j, k) as a separate observation and use statistical correction (clustering) to correct for the
dependence due to potential inclusion of multiple observations for the same person. As the size of the
window around the threshold declines, the likelihood that more than one observation per individual
is used declines and the distinction between individuals and shareholdings becomes irrelevant in the
limit (and is of small consequence for standard errors in practice).
There is a corresponding issue that relates to the deﬁnition of the outcome variable. Setting
up an E-ﬁrm can be deﬁned on a shareholding level: an individual transfers shares of particular
ﬁrm to an E-ﬁrm and may choose to do so for some ﬁrms but not for others. We will show some
evidence of the eﬀect on the shareholding level, but will primarily focus on the outcomes deﬁned on
the shareholder level. That is, our outcome variable Ej represents whether an individual adopted
any E-ﬁrm for any of her shareholdings. Hence, in our ﬁrst stage regression, the unit of observation
is (j, k), the corresponding running variable is Sj,k but the outcome is Ej  constant for all k.
In the network context (second stage), we want to retain the same structure on the treatment
level. The discontinuity is deﬁned on the level of the shareholding of the network member, (j, k).
The corresponding treatment aﬀects all individuals i who are related to the person j. Because
networks overlap, there is no straightforward way of collapsing information to the whole network
level. Instead, we treat each link (i, (j, k)) as a separate observation. As the result, a single
shareholding k of person j gives rise to multiple observations for all individuals who are in the same
network as j. Conversely, person i gives rise to multiple observations corresponding to links with
shareholdings of all her network members. As before, we deﬁne the outcome variable as setting up
any E-ﬁrm so that it is the same for all observations corresponding to individual i . We address
the corresponding dependence by two-way clustering of standard errors on i and j level. The
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likelihood of including multiple observations for an individual i should vanish as the window around
the threshold goes to zero but the likelihood of including multiple observations corresponding to the
network member j does not vanish since the same shareholding with a given value Sj corresponds
to multiple observations. Hence, correcting for the dependence on the level of a network member is
important even asymptotically.
4.2 Interpretation of the estimated coeﬃcients
As we discussed, the unit of observation for our analysis is the (directed) network relationship
and our baseline speciﬁcations 1 and 2 control for Xj only, rather than for characteristics of all
individuals in the family network. In general, individuals may be inﬂuenced by many diﬀerent
network members
Ei = αi + g(Xj , X−j) + γiZi + µi
Suppose that Xj ⊥ X−j (i.e., that in our RD context, the likelihood of being below/above the
10% threshold is uncorrelated in the network) and, counterfactually, that for each i we observe just
one randomly selected individual j. In that case, our speciﬁcation would estimate βi = E
[
∂g
∂Xj
∣∣∣Zi]
 the local average treatment eﬀect of exposing an additional network member to tax sheltering
opportunities, with equal weights assigned to all individuals. In our application though, we include
an observation for each network relationships (i, j) so that, instead, we weigh equally relationships
rather than individuals.
This strategy makes it straightforward to pursue estimation using relationship data and, as long
as the assumption Xj ⊥ X−j holds, it remains an unbiased estimator of treating an additional
relationship (not an individual!) in the network.
5 Regression discontinuity evidence
Our main identiﬁcation strategy exploits diﬀerences in eligibility for setting up an E-ﬁrm. As
discussed before, the newly created E-ﬁrm has to hold at least 10% of shares of the original ﬁrms.
Hence, taxpayers who own at least that much can set up an E-ﬁrm without further complications
while taxpayers who own less than 10% of shares have to either buy more or set up an E-ﬁrm
in cooperation with others. Recall Figure 2 that shows individual ownership share in 2004 (i.e.,
half a year before the 10% eligibility criterion was introduced) and the fraction of individuals
setting up E-ﬁrms by 1% bins (starting at round percentage values, inclusive, e.g. [0.10, 0.11)) for
a subsample of individuals that we describe below. As discussed before, the unit of observation
for this ﬁgure is a shareholding  an individual who owns shares in multiple ﬁrms corresponds to
multiple shareholdings and hence multiple observations. The adoption of the transition E ﬁrm here
is deﬁned as having set up an E-ﬁrm corresponding to any shareholding (rather than for the one
associated with the observation). Hence, the ﬁgure suggests that individuals who happen to have
a shareholding that inches just above the 10% mark are more likely to set up an E-ﬁrm (overall,
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not just or solely for this particular shareholding). The ﬁgure illustrates a number of points that
will be important below. First, there is an appearance of discontinuity at the threshold but there
is also enough variation in the data overall that careful statistical testing is necessary to establish
its presence. Second, it is a fuzzy RD design  E-ﬁrms are created by some individuals below
the threshold (by coordinating with others, through additional purchases of shares during 2005 or
because of imprecision in the running variable if there is corporate ownership) and take up is far
from universal above the threshold. Imperfect assignment implies that the eﬀects are very likely
to be heterogeneous across diﬀerent groups and we will investigate such heterogeneity. Third, the
pattern of adoption is nonlinear over the whole support but reasonably linear in the neighborhood
of 0.1; adoption increases signiﬁcantly with shareholding until it reaches a plateau at around 0.2
share above which around 20% of the population adopts (and the data is considerably noisier).
There is also some evidence that adoption may be declining at higher ownership levels, far from
the threshold. Consequently, we will restrict analysis to a reasonably narrow neighborhood of the
discontinuity point  in most cases, subsets of interval (0.05, 0.15)  where nonlinearity is not an
important issue.
Smoothness of the distribution
Figure 2 and our regression discontinuity analysis that follows does not utilize the full sample.
The full distribution is lumpy in many places including the threshold itself,10 and in order to
convincingly employ the regression discontinuity approach, the distribution of individual character-
istics should be smooth around the threshold. A closer inspection reveals that bunching is very
systematic  it occurs at points that correspond to splitting shares of the ﬁrm as exact fractions.
Thus, for one, non-randomly distributed observations at bunching points diﬀer from others because
they correspond to ﬁrms that choose to split ownership in such a regular way and it is possible
that observations that are bunched at these selected points are not similar to the neighboring ones
 splitting shares equally is likely to be correlated with many characteristics of individuals and
ﬁrms.11
Hence, we proceed by eliminating exact fractions from the sample as explained in the appendix.
The outcome of this trimming procedure in terms of the number of observations is shown on Figure
3The procedure is necessary to apply the regression discontinuity approach. It introduces a natural
limitation for the interpretation of our results: we are focusing on a subsample, so that the esti-
mated eﬀects are for the corresponding population only. We want to re-emphasize though that the
10Appendix Figure A1 shows the log of the number of observations in the full sample, by 0.1% bins. In the Appendix
we also show the analogue of Figure 2 in Figures A2 and A3 using the full sample with no adjustments. Figure A2
shows the likelihood of adopting the transition E rule for the particular shareholding, while Figure A3 shows the
likelihood of adopting for any shareholding of the corresponding individual.
11Beyond the number of observations, we found indication of non-smoothness for individual characteristics that we
investigate below for the restricted sample  this is expected, because these fractional observations are observa-
tionally diﬀerent than others. For example, looking at individuals with ownership shares in the interval (0.05, 0.15),
ﬁrms with fractional shares are more female (0.69 vs 0.75), younger (44.3 vs 46.60) and have fewer owners (6.33 vs
12.97). These diﬀerences in characteristics combined with discreteness of the distribution of fractional observations
generates non-smoothness of the overall distribution of characteristics in the full sample.
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procedure relies on a systematic selection rule based on pre-existing variable, so that it does not
depend on the eﬀect of any reform. The procedure does of course change the composition of the
sample  that is precisely its objective  but we expect that the resulting subsample satisﬁes the
necessary conditions for the RD design.
We proceed with the subsample deﬁned in that way in what follows. Figure 2 that we have
discussed before is based on this sample. Appendix Figure A4 shows the same on shareholding
level. In this sample, a number of characteristics - age, number of owners in a ﬁrm, gender and log
of the initial capital all change fairly continuously around the 10% mark for our restricted sample
(see Appendix Figures A5, A6, A7 and A8). The conditional mean of age and gender is noisy
but this is so mostly away from the threshold. An inspection of the density demonstrates that it
is still not completely smooth around the 0.25 share  our rules for eliminating fractions do not
seem suﬃcient for dealing with that bunching. Tax rules pre-reform also provided an incentive to
have active ownership below 2/3 in order not to be subject to the so-called split model that taxed
part of proﬁts at labor income tax rates  as the consequence, there are many examples of ﬁrm
that assigned just over 1/3 stake to passive owners, in particular often dividing it further in half
(e.g., among two children) and hence resulting in shareholdings of just over 1/6th  some of the
irregularities are likely associated with that. We draw two conclusions. First, the data around the
10% threshold appears reasonably smooth and we will limit the window around the threshold to at
most of 0.05 on each side, where the case for smoothness of the distribution is strongest. Second,
we will test robustness of the results by controlling for demographic characteristics.
The eﬀect of 10% rule on individual adoption
Figure 4 zooms in to the smaller region (0, 0.30) (using adoption deﬁned on the individual level
as in Figure 2), that more clearly displays the 10% threshold (with bins corresponding to 0.01
intervals). It also show point-wise standard errors of the mean within a bin. The likelihood of
taking up an E-ﬁrm jumps discontinuously at the 10% point. This is formally investigated in the
top panel of Table 2. The baseline regression is a linear probability model of the dummy for taking
up an E-ﬁrm ﬁrm on an indicator for being at or above the 10% mark in 2004 within a narrow
band around the 10% point. The ﬂexible controls speciﬁcation additionally allows for linear (and
possibly diﬀerent) terms on the left- and right-hand side of the threshold. We show the eﬀect in
adoption on shareholding level and (of our main interest) the eﬀect on shareholder level. The results
indicate that the discontinuity is present and very statistically signiﬁcant both if adoption is deﬁned
for shareholding and when it is deﬁned for an individual.12 In particular, our preferred estimates
(on shareholder level, using larger windows around the threshold) indicate that individuals just
12In what follows, the estimate of the magnitude of the discontinuity is sometimes sensitive to introducing ﬂexible
controls when very small window around the threshold is used, but it also corresponds to unrealistic estimates of
the corresponding coeﬃcients. Restricting the linear term to be the same on both sides of the discontinuity usually
stabilizes the results in such cases. The alternative would be to use an automatic bandwidth-selection procedure.
We opted to show estimates for a range of intervals in order to allow the reader to asses robustness of the results to
variation in bandwidth size directly.
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above the threshold are 4 percentage points more likely to adopt the E-ﬁrm, relative to the base of
approximately 10.5 percentage points  nearly 40% increase.
In the following panel we pursue basic robustness checks by including a set of individuals controls
that we investigate before  age, gender, number of individual owners and log capital. Inclusion of
these additional controls has small impact on both estimates and standard errors, providing some
comfort that composition diﬀerences are not driving the results.
While the evidence that the 10% ownership share matters for the decision to adopt the transition
E rule is robust, we are primarily interested in it in order to use it as ﬁrst stage and trace its
implications in the network. We are more likely to be able to statistically trace such responses if
the ﬁrst stage eﬀect is strong. Hence, we further investigate subsamples in order to zoom in on a
group, if any, that is particularly strongly aﬀected.
Since the beneﬁt of setting up an E-ﬁrm is due to reduction in taxation of capital gains or
dividends, individuals and ﬁrms that generate capital income should be more likely to adopt. Hence,
if we further restrict the sample to those shareholdings of individuals who received dividends in 2004
(i.e., pre-reform), results are noisier but arguably more pronounced (see also Appendix Figure A14),
and there is no discernible eﬀect for the remainder of subsample (Appendix Figure A15). The third
panel of Table 2 tests formally that the robust eﬀect is there for those with dividends in 2004
and that the magnitude of the eﬀect is much larger than for the full sample so that despite this
group including only about 1/3 of the original sample the t-statistics are of comparable magnitude
(consistently with the Appendix Figure A15, there is no robust evidence of an eﬀect for those with
no dividends; the results are not reported).
The following panel imposes an additional restriction on the sample by limiting it to those
individuals who own ﬁrms that have over 1000 shares  a group for which the abstraction of
continuous variation in ownership shares is more realistic. Figure 5 shows the likelihood of adoption
on an individual level for that sample, and we see a jump at the threshold. The last panel of Table
2 shows that the eﬀects are large and robust.13
Our ﬁnal piece of evidence on the individual level relates to how E-ﬁrms are set up. Individuals
can set up an E-ﬁrm either on their own or with others and the 10% rule makes it easier to pursue
the latter. Figures 6 and 7 show that the eﬀect is very clearly driven by setting up E-ﬁrms on one's
own, with little evidence that there is any decline in setting up E-ﬁrms with others.
Overall, the results in this section clearly demonstrate that the 10% discontinuity played an
important role in determining take up of E-ﬁrms. Those with just over 10% share are much more
likely to do so than those below and the diﬀerence is both economically and statistically large. The
eﬀect is heterogeneous. It is there for those who are most likely to beneﬁt from it  individuals
who have the history of receiving dividends. While this is intuitive, it also indicates that either
alternative means of setting up an E-ﬁrm (coordinating with others or purchasing additional shares)
are costly enough or that the information about availability of the shelter is not there, so that those
13Appendix Figure A16 shows no jump at the threshold for the remaining individuals owning ﬁrms with less than
1000 shares. Restricting the sample to just those with over 1000 shares, with no dividends-in-the-past restriction,
also strengthens results relative to the original sample.
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below 10% share who are otherwise similar do not end up taking up an E-ﬁrm. The E-ﬁrms
stimulated by the 10% rule are single owner ones, with no evidence of crowdout of multiple-owner
E-ﬁrms, suggesting that setting up an E-ﬁrm with others was not the alternative entertained by the
population complying with the treatment. Hence, those that take up E-ﬁrms as the result of the
treatment would have either been uninformed about this option or found coordination too costly in
the absence of the treatment.
Network eﬀects
We now turn to the network level analysis by analyzing take up of E-ﬁrms of an individual (i) as
a function of ownership of a network member (j). As discussed before, for this analysis, we focus
on the data on the shareholding level so that each shareholding of a family network member is a
separate observation aﬀecting the impacted individual. We limit attention to network members
who fall into subsamples in which we showed evidence of a discontinuity in adoption: we exclude
network members with fractional shares, and further zoom in on those receiving capital income and
in ﬁrms with large number of shares. We do not impose any additional restrictions on individuals
(i) themselves  the running variable (ownership share) is the property of the network member
and she may aﬀect family members regardless of their characteristics (though we will investigate
heterogeneity).
Before proceeding further, we want to make sure that when we compare individuals with network
members on either side of the 10% threshold, this is the only diﬀerence between those groups. Figure
A17 shows though that as the network member's share is crossing 10%, the share owned by the
individual itself is more likely to be above 10% as well. It turns out that this is driven by family
members owning identical number of shares in the same ﬁrm. Hence, in what follows, we restrict
attention to network links between individuals who do not own shares in the same ﬁrm (this is
our Xi ⊥ Xj orthogonality assumption). As ﬁgure 8 shows, in that subsample the likelihood
of having a share above 10% sails smoothly through the threshold. We restrict attention to this
subsample in what follows. Beyond the necessity of imposing this restriction to exploit discontinuity
for identiﬁcation purposes, it also has economic content: the interaction between treating and
treated individuals is guaranteed not to take place in the context of the ﬁrm, but rather has to
ﬂow through other channels.14
Figure 9 shows the discontinuity-based evidence of adoption elsewhere in the network on indi-
vidual adoption, and top panel of Table 3 shows the corresponding estimates. The estimates of the
discontinuity are generally signiﬁcant and reasonably stable as the window around 10% is adjusted.
Zooming in on individuals who own at least 10% ownership share in any ﬁrm strengthens the results.
While the network eﬀect may be present regardless of one's own ownership, individuals who already
own at least 10% are already eligible for setting up an E-ﬁrm without any additional arrangements
14Appendix Figure A9 shows the number of observations and Appendix Figures A10, A11, A12, A13, show age,
number of owners, gender and capital of treated ﬁrms with similar conclusions as in the case of individual-level
analysis: all these variables appear to sail smoothly through the 10% mark.
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and hence may be more strongly aﬀected. At the same, by virtue of their eligibility, they are more
likely to set up an E-ﬁrm regardless so that the additional network incentive might be expected
to be weaker for that reason. The eﬀects for this group are larger suggesting that the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates.
The second panel shows robustness of the results to inclusion of demographic controls  they
are essentially unaﬀected.
Following up on our previous discussion, we further split the sample by whether the network
member received dividends in 2004. Figure 10 shows suggestive evidence of discontinuity when the
family member received dividends  this is the group for which the ﬁrst stage was strong. At
the same time, Figure 11 shows no evidence of a discontinuity for the rest of the sample. The
bottom two panels of Table 3 show the corresponding estimates that conﬁrm these impressions. For
those with family members who received dividends, the eﬀects are of the expected sign and not too
sensitive to the size of the window or inclusion of controls. They are becoming signiﬁcant when
the window around the threshold (and sample size) grows and in narrow window when no controls
are included (the linear terms in ownership share are generally insigniﬁcant, consistently with the
impression from the ﬁgures). The results for those with family members who have not received
dividends are smaller and generally insigniﬁcant.15
That the results for those with family members who have not received dividends are generally
insigniﬁcant is consistent with the interpretation of take up by a family member reﬂecting the
presence of the treatment: since the direct eﬀect on take up for that group was not detectable, one
should not expect that their family members are aﬀected. 16
In Table 4 we split the sample in additional ways. First, we look at those with family members
with dividends in 2004 and ﬁrms with over 1000 shares. In this group, the ﬁrst stage was strong and
the corresponding results are strong here as well. Then, we split the sample by whether the treated
individual itself received dividends in 2004. We ﬁnd much stronger statistical evidence for those
who did not receive dividends themselves than for those who did. The coeﬃcients for those without
dividends are larger in absolute value despite the lower base and hence are also economically very
signiﬁcant  for example, the estimated eﬀect of 0.04 for the ﬂexible speciﬁcation corresponds to
roughly doubling the take up. A rough taxonomy of the results is that individuals with most to gain
(those with dividends) are most responsive to the 10% threshold incentive, but they stimulate take
up by individuals who have less potential to gain (those without past dividends) and so perhaps
least informed otherwise.
15Appendix Table A1 shows the results from the speciﬁcation that pools network links with and without dividends,
but includes a dummy for the network member having received dividends, its interaction with crossing the threshold
and ownership share controls restricted to be the same across groups  this restriction strengthens the results.
16As we discussed in the context of the model in Appendix A, in principle the treatment may have an eﬀect on
family members even when it does not aﬀect the decision of the treated individual itself. In particular, those without
dividends may choose not to take up the shelter but having been given an opportunity to do so may now be in a
position to inform others. Although the network results for that subsample are for the most part insigniﬁcant, they
are consistently positive and fairly stable as the window around the discontinuity point widens.
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6 Eﬀect on timing
In order to further substantiate the presence of network eﬀects, we investigate a diﬀerent dimension
 timing. We will return below to regression discontinuity based evidence but begin by providing
suggestive evidence of a strong association between timing of adoption in the network and individual
adoption.
Figures 12-15 illustrate the dynamics of setting up tax shelters in the data. Figure 12 shows the
adoption of the tax shelter by individuals with (exposed) and without (not exposed) a family
member setting up a tax shelter prior to June 17 2005 (ie., those who were able to meet the tight
eligibility criteria, one needed 90% ownership stake to be transferred to the E-ﬁrm). Exposed
individuals end up approximately 6 percentage points more likely to eventually set up a tax shelter.
Figure 13 represents the same information as the CDF of the timing of adoption conditional on
ultimately setting up the tax shelter and it shows that even conditional on ultimate adoption there
are diﬀerences in timing  those who have exposed family members adopt earlier than others.
There are few adoptions during the early period: as also visible in Figure 1, the timing of adoption
is heavily concentrated toward the end of the period. Figures 14 and 15 show analogous exercise
but this time splitting the sample according to having a family network adopter prior December
1st, 2005 (the date is arbitrarily selected for illustrative purposes; close to half of all of the ultimate
E-ﬁrms have been set up by that point). As before, individuals in exposed networks are more
likely to ultimately set up a holding company and they do so earlier than those who have no family
members who already set up an E ﬁrm. Perhaps because of the relatively short period of time left
before the deadline, it is a bit harder to make the claim that the potential network eﬀect wears oﬀ
over time, although Figure 15 appears consistent with the two series converging a few days before
the end of December. These patterns cannot be interpreted as causal but they do suggest that there
is correlation between adoption by network members in the past and individual's own adoption of
the tax shelter. They also suggest that there may be an eﬀect on timing: individuals in networks
with early adopters are not just more likely to adopt in general, they also tend to adopt earlier than
others.
Table 5 shows the result of regressing E-ﬁrm adoption dummy on the indicator for having some-
body in the family network adopting by a particular date, with various sets of controls. Only the
coeﬃcient on the network dummy is reported and each cell corresponds to a diﬀerent regression.
The ﬁrst panels show the results of regressing the dummy for ever setting up an E-ﬁrm on the
dummies for having somebody in the network setting up by June 17, November 1 and December 1.
Consistently with the graphs discussed before, the results of baseline regressions with no controls
show a strong eﬀect in each case. In the second column, we control for a number of demographic
characteristics: gender, immigrant dummy, urban dummy, self-employment status, education dum-
mies, business/law education dummy, number of children and age dummies (decades). Including
these controls does not have a strong eﬀect on the estimated coeﬃcient although many of them are
individually very signiﬁcant (not reported). The ﬁnal column shows the eﬀect of including economic
controls: logarithms of total income, net worth, capital income and 2004 dividends. Inclusion of
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these variables reduces the estimated network coeﬃcients but they do retain statistical signiﬁcance.
This indicates that early take up in one's network correlates with individual economic characteristics
that are relevant to take up decisions, but that it works beyond them.
These results suggest, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the early adoption in the network is correlated
with individual economic circumstances. At the same time, expecting that adoption by a family
member before June or even November makes the diﬀerence for ultimate adoption may be somewhat
of a stretch: the eﬀect may be on timing rather than ultimate adoption especially if members of
networks adopting early are likely to adopt in general. To rudimentarily pursue it further, we note
in the following two panels that adoption before December 1st is more robustly explained by family
network adoption before November 1st and adoption before November 1st appears correlated with
family network adoption pre-June 17. Especially in the latter case, the eﬀect of economic controls
on the estimated coeﬃcient is weakened. This is consistent with the coeﬃcient on early adoption
picking up the eﬀect of inducement over the short horizons, but at least partially reﬂecting the eﬀect
of correlation of early adoption in networks with economic characteristics that ultimately matter over
a longer horizon. At the same time, it is interesting to note that demographic characteristics, (while
individually signiﬁcant) do not seem to be correlated with early adoption. Overall, these results
suggest that while adoption of an E-ﬁrm is also correlated with many demographic characteristics,
it does not seem that correlation of early adoption in the family networks is related to these factors.
At the same time, it appears that the link between adoption and the network is less sensitive to the
inclusion of controls as the horizon is reduced. This is intuitive: the impact of having someone in
the network adopting should be on timing ﬁrst of all and while the eﬀect may persist in the longer
term, it's possible that it's hard to distinguish from the eﬀect of other characteristics correlated
with early adoption.
This motivates our subsequent strategy that is more careful about timing. We regress the
dummy for taking up an E-ﬁrm in a particular week on having somebody in the network take up
a week before. Under this strategy, the interest is in the timing of adoption rather than the longer
term eﬀect. It's possible that taxpayers in the network are exposed to the same shocks (for example
news) at the same time, but it is harder to make the case that individuals would happen to make
similar decisions at similar time based purely on correlation in characteristics that are constant over
time absent common shocks or interactions.
Figure 16 shows the results for family network based on simple OLS regressions. This is again a
linear probability model and this is a hazard-like context. Week 1 corresponds to the last week before
1/1/2006 (and the right-hand side variable is adoption a week before that) and higher numbers
correspond to earlier adoption. The ﬁgure shows the baseline eﬀect (constant) that represents
adoption of the tax shelter by individuals with no exposure in the family network in the preceding
week and the eﬀect of those who were exposed last week (the sum of the constant and the coeﬃcient
on the exposure dummy), together with the 95% conﬁdence interval for the latter. There is a
signiﬁcant eﬀect for the last eight weeks of the year and some weeks before that. At the longer
horizon, the eﬀect is gone. It is possible that a week is in the right ballpark of the timing of
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inducement eﬀect late in the game, but is too short of a period earlier when there is no reason to
rush.
Figure 17 compares the baseline estimated coeﬃcients to the coeﬃcients based on a speciﬁcation
with the set of demographic and economic controls as before. Contrary to the prior analysis that
used wide range of adoption, the controls have very little impact on the magnitude of the eﬀect.
This strengthens the possibility that these estimates have causal interpretation and that they don't
simply reﬂect correlation in characteristics. Finally, ﬁgure 18 shows the eﬀect of adoption in the
last 3 weeks rather than 1 week. These estimates are smoother and more robustly extending further
out, but a bit smaller, suggesting that the recent take up has stronger eﬀect than take up further
out
These results are suggestive, but cannot be interpreted as causal. We use our regression disconti-
nuity approach to further corroborate the presence of interesting timing eﬀects. In all the following
speciﬁcation we focus on the 0.05 window around the discontinuity point.
In Table 6 we look at the eﬀect on the number of days before 1/1/2006 when the tax shelter
was established, with individuals not establishing the shelter assigned a zero value. The OLS
speciﬁcation results in positive, but for the most part insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for the full and
dividend samples. Since timing is a censored variable, these results are biased downward. As an
alternative, in the following panel we makes the normality assumption and estimate the eﬀect on
the date of setting up a shelter via Tobit speciﬁcation. The Tobit estimates have the same sign
as the OLS ones but, consistently with the expected OLS bias, are much larger and statistically
signiﬁcant. The results indicate that having a family member exposed to the 10% rule accelerated
take up of the tax shelter by as much as 20 days; the results are robustly signiﬁcant for the sample
with dividends, smaller for the full sample, and possibly zero (with large standard errors) for those
with family members who did not have dividends in 2004.
In Appendix Tables A2-A5 we focus on results for particular periods for the full sample and
those with at least 10% ownership. Focusing on the results for everyone, in Appendix Table A2 we
report results from probit speciﬁcations The table contains an estimate of the eﬀect on probability of
adopting at the threshold and the eﬀects on log probability to allow for more meaningful comparison
across diﬀerent periods.17 The eﬀect is strongest in the second month before the deadline and it
appears to be there for both those with and without network members who received dividends.
The evidence of the eﬀect in the last month is weaker and inconsistent across speciﬁcations. The
results for three or four months prior to the reform do not indicate an eﬀect though they are noisy
and sometimes counterintuitive, reﬂecting a small number of individuals taking up in this period.
Appendix Table A3 shows the cumulative eﬀect  impact on adoption by the time of the reform
(same as our main speciﬁcation) and by 30, 60 or 90 days pre-reform. For the full sample, the
results indicate that the bulk of the eﬀect is already there 30 days before the reform. For those with
family members who have received dividends, the eﬀect appears to be continuing until the deadline.
17We use probit, because in periods distant from the reform probabilities are very close to zero. The results are
very robust to using linear probability model instead.
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7 Conclusions
We considered adoption of a legal tax sheltering strategy in Norwegian family networks. Relying
on a regression discontinuity design in the incentives to adopt, we showed that family members
of individuals who had a strong incentive to pursue tax sheltering (and who, in fact, responded
accordingly) are more likely to pursue tax avoidance themselves. This is further corroborated by
the evidence from the timing of responses. These patterns are not uniform across diﬀerent group
of individuals. The propensity to adopt at discontinuity is strongest by individuals who are most
likely to beneﬁt (as measured by history of capital income) and its their family networks that are
aﬀected. At the same time, it is those members of family networks who themselves do not have
a strong reason to pursue tax avoidance that respond most strongly. This is consistent with two
possibilities: these are either uniformed individuals or they face high cost of adoption relative to
beneﬁts and that this cost is reduced by having a family member familiar with the process.
More generally, our results provide one of the ﬁrst empirically well-identiﬁed examples that tax
planning is a social phenomena that is aﬀected by what others do. Recent work by Pomeranz
(2015) highlights that network incentives matter in the VAT context; in our case, however, there
is no compliance spillover that may explain our ﬁndings  the strategy is legal and networks are
not linked by business interests that could explain correlated behavior. Instead, it is knowledge,
reduced costs of planning or norms that need to be transmitted within a network. Our evidence of
heterogeneous patterns of response points to knowledge and cost as likely channels.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
#Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max
Male 199581 0.747 0.435 0 1
Age 199581 46.473 13.285 0 95
Age<30 199581 0.077 0.267 0 1
Age 30-40 199581 0.241 0.428 0 1
Age 40-50 199581 0.269 0.443 0 1
Age 50-70 199581 0.357 0.479 0 1
Age>70+ 199581 0.047 0.211 0 1
Married/cohabiting with children 199581 0.729 0.444 0 1
Number of children 199581 1.871 1.257 0 16
Immigrant 199581 0.037 0.189 0 1
Urban 199581 0.780 0.414 0 1
University 199581 0.341 0.474 0 1
High school 199581 0.550 0.498 0 1
Business education 199581 0.086 0.281 0 1
Self-employment 199581 0.234 0.424 0 1
Net worth, 2004 199581 1657344.000 18800000.000 0 4e+09
Capital income, 2004 199581 366129.500 6175710.000 0 2.19e+09
Total income, 2004 199581 757245.600 6207851.000 -40200000 2.18e+09
Total dividends in 2004 199581 297202.700 6188591.000 0 2.18e+09
E-ﬁrm dummy 199581 0.082 0.274 0 1
E-ﬁrm before June 17 199581 0.001 0.026 0 1
E-ﬁrm before Nov 1 199581 0.010 0.098 0 1
E-ﬁrm before Dec 1 199581 0.032 0.175 0 1
E-ﬁrm in family network 199581 0.120 0.325 0 1
E-ﬁrm in family before June 17 199581 0.001 0.037 0 1
E-ﬁrm in family before Nov 1 199581 0.016 0.127 0 1
E-ﬁrm in family before Dec 1 199581 0.050 0.218 0 1
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Table 2: The eﬀect of crossing 10% ownership on E-ﬁrm take up
Adoption for shareholding Adoption by an individual
Range No controls Flexible N No controls Flexible N
[0.095, 0.105] 0.034* 0.145*** 1246 0.041* 0.155*** 1246
(0.019) (0.044) (0.022) (0.047)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.027** 0.070** 2416 0.035** 0.073** 2416
(0.013) (0.029) (0.015) (0.032)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.047*** 0.033* 5009 0.039*** 0.041* 5009
(0.009) (0.019) (0.010) (0.021)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.052*** 0.041*** 7669 0.043*** 0.039** 7669
(0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.017)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.055*** 0.049*** 13388 0.050*** 0.040*** 13388
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.013)
Everyone with demographic controls
[0.095, 0.105] 0.025 0.152*** 1246 0.034 0.160*** 1246
(0.019) (0.043) (0.021) (0.046)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.026** 0.062** 2416 0.034** 0.064** 2416
(0.013) (0.029) (0.014) (0.032)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.048*** 0.029 5008 0.041*** 0.036* 5008
(0.009) (0.019) (0.010) (0.021)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.057*** 0.036** 7664 0.049*** 0.034** 7664
(0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.017)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.063*** 0.045*** 13378 0.060*** 0.036*** 13378
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.013)
Individuals with dividends in 2004
[0.095, 0.105] 0.109** 0.461*** 390 0.118** 0.434*** 390
(0.046) (0.095) (0.047) (0.098)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.086*** 0.223*** 767 0.098*** 0.220*** 767
(0.031) (0.066) (0.032) (0.068)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.070*** 0.133*** 1613 0.066*** 0.135*** 1613
(0.020) (0.044) (0.021) (0.045)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.088*** 0.087** 2450 0.085*** 0.082** 2450
(0.016) (0.035) (0.017) (0.037)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.084*** 0.101*** 4415 0.083*** 0.096*** 4415
(0.012) (0.026) (0.012) (0.027)
Dividends in 2004 and ﬁrms with at least 1000 shares
[0.095, 0.105] 0.138*** 0.453*** 293 0.141** 0.425*** 293
(0.053) (0.100) (0.055) (0.103)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.121*** 0.240*** 528 0.144*** 0.227*** 528
(0.039) (0.072) (0.041) (0.075)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.112*** 0.156*** 1072 0.112*** 0.170*** 1072
(0.027) (0.053) (0.028) (0.055)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.125*** 0.132*** 1614 0.128*** 0.130*** 1614
(0.022) (0.044) (0.023) (0.046)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.114*** 0.139*** 2909 0.121*** 0.141*** 2909
(0.016) (0.034) (0.017) (0.035)
Notes: Flexible speciﬁcations include linear terms on each side of the threshold
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Table 3: The eﬀect of crossing 10% ownership by a family network member on E-ﬁrm take up
Everyone At least 10% share
Range No controls Flexible N No controls Flexible N
[0.095, 0.105] 0.034** -0.005 1935 0.062** -0.005 1117
(0.017) (0.028) (0.027) (0.051)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.029** 0.031 3473 0.045** 0.057 1940
(0.012) (0.023) (0.020) (0.039)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.019** 0.040** 6799 0.031** 0.065** 3652
(0.008) (0.016) (0.014) (0.027)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.015** 0.033** 10580 0.023** 0.056** 5632
(0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.023)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.009* 0.028*** 18295 0.015* 0.043** 9651
(0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.018)
Everyone with demographic controls
[0.095, 0.105] 0.034** -0.002 1931 0.056** -0.007 1116
(0.017) (0.028) (0.027) (0.049)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.028** 0.034 3467 0.039* 0.053 1939
(0.012) (0.023) (0.020) (0.037)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.018** 0.039** 6785 0.026* 0.057** 3647
(0.008) (0.016) (0.014) (0.027)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.013** 0.033** 10562 0.017 0.048** 5626
(0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.023)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.008 0.027*** 18263 0.011 0.037** 9643
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017)
Network members with dividends in 2004
[0.095, 0.105] 0.056** 0.050 503 0.114** 0.035 285
(0.028) (0.035) (0.048) (0.063)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.058** 0.061* 924 0.110*** 0.098* 504
(0.024) (0.034) (0.040) (0.059)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.032** 0.081*** 2017 0.060** 0.148*** 1060
(0.015) (0.029) (0.027) (0.050)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.025** 0.058** 3134 0.046** 0.113*** 1623
(0.012) (0.025) (0.021) (0.043)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.024*** 0.033* 5822 0.038** 0.066** 3056
(0.009) (0.019) (0.015) (0.033)
Network members without dividends in 2004
[0.095, 0.105] 0.026 -0.036 1432 0.043 -0.047 832
(0.020) (0.036) (0.031) (0.067)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.020 0.018 2549 0.023 0.037 1436
(0.014) (0.028) (0.023) (0.049)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.013 0.026 4782 0.018 0.037 2592
(0.010) (0.020) (0.017) (0.033)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.010 0.025 7446 0.013 0.036 4009
(0.008) (0.017) (0.014) (0.028)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.001 0.027** 12473 0.004 0.035* 6595
(0.006) (0.013) (0.010) (0.021)
Notes: Flexible speciﬁcations include linear terms on each side of the threshold
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Table 4: The eﬀect of crossing 10% ownership by a family network member on E-ﬁrm take up -
decomposition of response
Everyone At least 10% share
Range No controls Flexible N No controls Flexible N
Network members with dividends in 2004 and ﬁrms over 1000 share
[0.095, 0.105] 0.074** 0.013 380 0.142*** -0.018 225
(0.032) (0.036) (0.053) (0.062)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.065** 0.071** 662 0.127** 0.116* 376
(0.029) (0.036) (0.049) (0.062)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.049** 0.090*** 1365 0.090*** 0.161*** 747
(0.020) (0.034) (0.034) (0.058)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.035** 0.078** 2161 0.065** 0.142*** 1149
(0.015) (0.030) (0.027) (0.052)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.033*** 0.045* 3990 0.054*** 0.090** 2153
(0.011) (0.024) (0.019) (0.041)
Network members with dividends in 2004, individuals without dividends
[0.095, 0.105] 0.069** 0.041 328 0.122** 0.007 186
(0.032) (0.037) (0.051) (0.059)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.081*** 0.059 615 0.141*** 0.072 328
(0.029) (0.039) (0.049) (0.062)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.035** 0.096*** 1377 0.065** 0.161*** 706
(0.017) (0.035) (0.031) (0.057)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.031** 0.068** 2180 0.062*** 0.114** 1085
(0.012) (0.029) (0.023) (0.051)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.028*** 0.041* 4067 0.048*** 0.081** 2032
(0.009) (0.021) (0.017) (0.038)
Network members and individuals with dividends in 2004
[0.095, 0.105] 0.035 0.076 175 0.135 0.134 99
(0.049) (0.065) (0.087) (0.132)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.011 0.069 309 0.050 0.170 176
(0.035) (0.060) (0.058) (0.107)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.031 0.054 640 0.062 0.136* 354
(0.028) (0.047) (0.046) (0.082)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.020 0.049 954 0.027 0.125* 538
(0.024) (0.043) (0.040) (0.070)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.018 0.030 1755 0.030 0.055 1024
(0.018) (0.035) (0.028) (0.057)
Notes: The table shows the eﬀect of restricting the sample to network members that have over 1000 shares and the decomposition
of response by whether the individual had dividends
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Table 5: The eﬀect of early adoption on take up
Ultimate adoption
Adoption No
controls
Demographic
controls
Demographic
& income
controls
N
Before June 17th 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.055*** 199443
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Before November 1st 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.038*** 197642
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Before December 1st 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.042*** 193267
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Adoption before December 1st
Before June 17th 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.028** 199443
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Before November 1st 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.006** 197642
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Adoption before November 1st
Before June 17th 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 199443
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Notes: Demographic controls include gender, immigrant dummy, urban dummy, self-employment status, education dummies,
business education dummy, number of children and age dummies (decades). Economic controls include log of income, log of
capital income, log of net worth and log of dividends, all as of 2004
Table 6: The eﬀect of crossing 10% ownership by a family network member on E-ﬁrm take up 
distance of the date of adoption to 1/1/2006.
Everyone At least 10% share
OLS
Range No controls Flexible N No controls Flexible N
All 0.273 0.669 18295 0.218 0.960 9651
(0.261) (0.606) (0.446) (1.065)
Dividends 0.995* 1.218 5822 1.387 2.592 3056
(0.512) (1.198) (0.908) (2.135)
No dividends -0.080 0.480 12473 -0.347 0.357 6595
(0.322) (0.686) (0.547) (1.192)
Tobit
All 5.323* 16.039** 18295 4.863 14.255** 9651
(3.179) (6.606) (3.256) (6.851)
Dividends 15.005*** 19.821* 5822 13.374** 23.671** 3056
(5.384) (11.225) (5.638) (12.047)
No dividends 0.369 15.053* 12473 0.354 10.981 6595
(4.033) (8.014) (4.118) (8.160)
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of days from the date of adoption to the 1/1/2006 deadline. The coeﬃcients
should be interpreted as the number of days
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Figure 1: Timing of setting up holding ﬁrms under Transition E rule
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Figure 2: Ownership share in 2004 and probability of ultimate adoption of the Transition E rule
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Figure 3: Distribution of ownership shares in 2004 around the 10% threshold
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Figure 4: Ownership share in 2004 and probability of ultimate adoption of the Transition E rule 
individual level, excluding fractions
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Figure 5: Ownership share in 2004 and probability of ultimate adoption of the Transition E rule 
ﬁrms with over 1000 shares and dividends realized in 2004
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Figure 6: Ownership share in 2004 and single-owner E-ﬁrms around the 10% threshold
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Figure 7: Ownership share in 2004 and multiple owner E-ﬁrms, around the 10% threshold
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Ownership share (shareholding level)
E−
fir
m
s 
w
ith
 m
u
lti
pl
e 
ow
n
e
rs
Figure 8: Family member's ownership share in 2004 and number of individuals at least 10% shares
 individuals not owning the same ﬁrm
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Figure 9: Family member's ownership share in 2004 and ultimate adoption of the Transition E rule
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Figure 10: Family member's ownership share in 2004 and ultimate adoption of the Transition E
rule  network member's who received dividends in 2004
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Figure 11: Family member's ownership share in 2004 and ultimate adoption of the Transition E
rule  network members who did not receive dividends in 2004
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Figure 12: Adoption by individuals with and without a family member adopting before 6/17/2005
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Figure 13: Timing of adoption by individuals with and without a family member adopting before
6/17/2005 (conditional on ultimately adopting)
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Figure 14: Adoption by individuals with and without family member adopting before 12/1/2005
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Figure 15: Timing of adoption by individuals with and without family member adopting before
12/1/2005 (conditional on ultimately adopting)
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Figure 16: The eﬀect of a family member adopting a week earlier (OLS with no controls)
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Figure 17: The eﬀect of a family member adopting a week earlier (OLS with controls)
5 10 15 20
−0.010
−0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
Weeks until 1/1/2006
Ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
ta
ke
 u
p
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l l
l l
l With controls
Without controls
95% CI with controls
Figure 18: The eﬀect of a family member adopting in the last 3 weeks (OLS with controls)
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A Theoretical framework
We are interested in understanding how adoption of tax avoidance strategies within a network aﬀects the individual
shareholder's uptake of such strategies. Consider individuals j and i who are linked in the family network. We are
interested in the determinants of the decision to adopt an E-ﬁrm, Ei, that we presume is determined by a latent
variable E˜i, Ei = I(E˜i > 0) (where I is an indicator function). We assume that E˜i = fi(Ki, Xi) + εi where Ki is the
set of endogenous variables that may play a role in individual interactions (though, to simplify notation, we will be
explicit about it only where it matters), Xi is the set of individual characteristics and εi is the error term orthogonal
to fi(·). To ﬁx attention, we will refer to Ki as taxpayer's awareness of tax shelter possibility. In general, we assume
that Ki(Kj ,K
i
−j , Xi), where Kj is awareness of taxpayer j and K
i
−j is awareness of individuals in the network other
than j, but we will mostly consider just two individuals, so that Ki(Kj , Xi) and Kj(Ki, Xj). We also assume that
derivatives of f and K are non-negative.
The framework assumes that individuals aﬀect each other through variables K and allows for reciprocal reac-
tions.18 For our purposes, we do not need to assume symmetry so that functions Ki(·) and Kj(·) may be diﬀerent.
We focus on the interaction between i and j and are agnostic about the role of K−j at this point, but we will return
to it below. Shocks to the environment are represented by the eﬀect on Xi. Common shocks could aﬀect both Xi
and Xj simultaneously, but in what follows we will focus on tracing out implications of an idiosyncratic shock to
individual j, ∆Xj , that corresponds to the source of identiﬁcation that we explore in our empirical work.
Shocks may potentially have four diﬀerent qualitative eﬀects. First, they aﬀect awareness of the recipient directly
(when it is the shock to individual own environment) when
∂Kj
∂Xj
6= 0. Second, they may aﬀect awareness of others
when ∂Ki
∂Kj
6= 0 (with the feedback to the original recipient when ∂Kj
∂Ki
6= 0). Third, the overall impact on awareness
matters for sheltering behavior when
∂fj
∂Kj
6= 0. Fourth, sheltering may be aﬀected by the shock directly without
altering interactions with others ( ∂E
∂Xj
6= 0).19
The total impact of the shock to individual j on the individual itself may be traced out as follows:
∆E˜j
∆Xj
=
∂fj
∂Kj
∆Kj
∆Xj
+
∂fj
∂Xj
,
∆Kj
∆Xj
=
∂Kj
∂Ki
∆Ki
∆Xj
+
∂Kj
∂Xj
+
∂Kj
∂Kj−i
∆Kj−i
∆Xj
The eﬀect on individual i has similar structure except for the lack of direct eﬀects:
∆E˜i
∆Xj
=
∂fi
∂Ki
∆Ki
∆Xj
,
∆Ki
∆xj
=
∂Ki
∂Kj
∆Kj
∆Xj
+
∂Ki
∂Ki−j
∆Ki−j
∆Xj
Without observing awareness directly, an econometrician can estimate reduced form eﬀects
∆E˜j
∆Xj
and ∆E˜i
∆Xj
.
Remark 1. Suppose that ∆E˜i
∆Xj
6= 0. It implies then that ∆Ki
∆Xj
6= 0, thereby providing evidence of social interactions
between individuals.
This observation underlies our basic test. We will attempt to estimate the eﬀect on ∆E˜i
∆Xj
by using variation
in Xj that is (assumed) independent of Xi. The independence assumption is natural in the presence of explicit
18This framework is general enough to accommodate many economically interesting special cases. For example,
suppose that Xj represents information of individual j. A shock to xj may aﬀect individual i when person i and
j interact, but there need not be a feedback eﬀect on individual j since person i has no additional information
over person j as the result of that shock. This case ﬁts in this framework by allowing K to be two-dimensional,
(K1,K2) with
∂K1j
∂Xj
6= 0 , ∂K2i
∂K1j
6= 0 and ∂K2j
∂K2i
=
∂K1j
∂K2i
= 0, for example when K1i(K1j ,K2j , Xi) = g(Xi) and
K2i(K1j ,K2j , Xi) = h(K1j) for all i, j so that a signal aﬀects own awareness K1 and, through this channel, network
member's outside knowledge K2 but there is no feedback from K2 on others.
19Note that separating K from adoption E˜ allows shock to individual j to aﬀect take up of individual i without
aﬀecting propensity of an individual j to take up  this would be the case whenever
∂fj
∂Kj
∆Kj
∆Xj
+
∂fj
∂Xj
= 0 (in particular,
when both derivatives of fi are zero) but
∆Ki
∆Xj
6= 0. For example, an individual j may (exogenously) learn about
sheltering opportunity that is not of interest to her (given all her characteristics Xj) but still pass such information
to others.
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randomization, for example as in Duﬂo and Saez (2003); we are going instead to rely on a regression discontinuity
design that also makes such an assumption plausible and appealing.
Remark 2. ∆E˜j
∆Xj
6= 0 is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for the presence of social interactions.
Observing that an individual responds to his own incentives is not suﬃcient to establish presence of interactions.
It is also strictly speaking not a necessary condition (see an example in footnote 18  a taxpayer who is exposed to
information about a shelter may transmit information to others but not act on it) although it is arguably unlikely.
The formulae for
∆Kj
∆xj
and ∆Ki
∆xj
reﬂect interactions between those terms but can be combined to obtain:
∆Kj
∆xj
=
(
∂Kj
∂xj
+
∂Kj
∂Kj−i
∆Kj−i
∆xj
+
∂Kj
∂Ki
∂Ki
∂Ki−j
∆Ki−j
∆xj
)
· S−1 (3)
∆Ki
∆xj
=
∂Ki
∂Kj
(
∂Kj
∂xj
+
∂Kj
∂Kj−i
∆Kj−i
∆xj
+
1
∂Ki/∂Kj
∂Ki
∂Ki−j
∆Ki−j
∆xj
)
· S−1 (4)
where S = 1 − ∂Ki
∂Kj
∂Kj
∂Ki
is the social multiplier that measures the magniﬁcation of the direct eﬀect (with
∂Ki
∂Kj
∂Kj
∂Ki
< 1 being a necessary condition for stability). To illustrate the logic of this condition, assume for the
moment that ∂Ki
∂Ki−j
∆Ki−j
∆Xj
≈ 0, that is that the eﬀect of Xj on individuals in the network of i other than j is
negligible. In such a case, ∆Ki
∆Xj
= ∂Ki
∂Kj
∆Kj
∆Xj
and plugging back into formulas for E˜, yields
βj ≡ ∆E˜j
∆Xj
=
∂fj
∂Xj
+
∂fj
∂Kj
(
∂Kj
∂Xj
/
S
)
(5)
βi ≡ ∆E˜i
∆Xj
=
∂Ki
∂Kj
· ∂fi
∂Ki
(
∂Kj
∂Xj
/
S
)
. (6)
Individual j responds to a change in Xj due to the direct eﬀect it has on sheltering and due to the eﬀect it has on
own awareness Kj . The latter eﬀect is magniﬁed due to the presence of interaction reﬂected by term S. Sheltering
of person i is not aﬀected by Xj directly, but it is aﬀected through the awareness channel. The exogenous shift
in awareness is due to the impact it has on awareness of person j (magniﬁed by the presence of spillover eﬀect S).
This shift aﬀects person i's awareness to the extent that interactions are present  ∂Ki
∂Kj
 and aﬀects the ultimate
decision to the extent that awareness matters for sheltering, ∂fi
∂Ki
6= 0.
In general, separately identifying the direct impact on sheltering
∂fj
∂Xj
, the impact through increased awareness
∂fj
∂Kj
∆Kj
∆Xj
and the interaction eﬀect ∂Ki
∂Kj
based on estimates of
∆E˜j
∆Xj
and ∆E˜i
∆Xj
is not possible. Note though that
Remark 3. Assuming that ∂fj
∂Xj
≥ 0 and ∂Ki
∂K−j
∆Ki−j
∆xj
≈ 0,20 we have βi
βj
= ∆E˜i
∆xj
/
∆E˜j
∆xj
≤ ∂Ki
∂Kj
∂fi
∂Ki
∂fj
∂Kj
with equality
when
∂fj
∂Xj
= 0 and ∂Ki
∂K−j
∆Ki−j
∆xj
= 0.
so that the ratio of the coeﬃcients contains information about the strength of the social interactions.
20Assuming that ∂Ki
∂K−j
∆Ki−j
∆xj
≈ 0 is restrictive but allows for a major simpliﬁcations of formulas 3 and 4. That
assumption does not rule out eﬀects on others  indeed, other members of the network of person j can be still
aﬀected and inﬂuence person i  but it rules out feedback eﬀects of higher than second-order: a shock to person j
aﬀecting person i who in turn aﬀects some other person k and recognizing the feedback from person k back to i and
j. Imposing additional structure on the model may allow for incorporating these types of eﬀects. The complication
in our context is that networks are not disjoint so that modeling equilibrium is considerably less tractable than in the
case of, for example, peer eﬀects within a school or neighborhood eﬀects. We leave addressing this issue for future
work. The second aspect of restrictiveness of this assumption is that individuals i and j may (and, indeed, usually
will) have common network members so that even if one was willing to rule out higher order feedback eﬀects, some
members of Ki−j may not be ignored. This is a conceptually separate issue that may be explicitly addressed by
enumerating those individuals in arguments of Ki and Kj . Denoting a set of common network members by M ,
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To make progress, assume indeed that
∂fj
∂Xj
= 0. 21 Then, making an additional assumption that
∂fj
∂Kj
= ∂fi
∂Ki
(or that the ratio of the two terms is some other known constant), the ratio βi
βj
would identify the strength of social
interactions as the ratio of the two eﬀects.
The assumption,
∂fj
∂Kj
= ∂fi
∂Ki
, is restrictive. When the level of awareness for the individuals varies, Ki 6= Kj . In
fact, in our case, we will contend that individuals who are aﬀected by the shock that we rely on to identify the eﬀect
are relatively well informed anyway while those in their networks are not so that Kj > Ki. In that case, we would
expect
∂fj
∂Kj
≤ ∂fi
∂Ki
.
B Procedure for removing fractions
As mentioned in text, there is clustering of individuals at particular fractional points and it is not limited just to
fractions with small base or equal splitting. For example, there are 662 observations with the share of precisely
1/12 ≈ 0.833 and the total number of observations in interval [0.083, 0.084) is 888 while the number of observation in
surrounding 1/1000th intervals are 216 in [0.082, 0.083) and 134 in [0.084, 0.085). Our objective is to apply procedure
that would eliminate such bunching in a way that is systematic but at the same time would allows us for keeping
as many observations as possible (after all, every shareholding is a fraction with the denominator equal to the total
number of shares in a ﬁrm). We eliminated shareholdings that are exact fractions with denominators between 1
and 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 100 and 200. In particular, this removes all shareholding that are multiples of 0.005, and of
course the discontinuity point 0.1 itself. We additionally remove points that are within 1 share of a fraction with the
denominator of 3, 6, 9 or 10  there is evidence of bunching at that kind as well that is particularly strong for these
values and occurs very close to the discontinuity point when the denominator is 9 or 10. The resulting histogram is
Figure 3 and it no longer shows evidence of signiﬁcant bunching when aggregated to 0.001 intervals. The procedure
eliminates a large part of the sample  24,294 out of 47,682 observations in the (0.05, 0.15) interval (with almost
7,600 removed observations at 0.1 and another 5,600 at other 1/100th multiples in the interval). Results are robust
to adjustments involving reasonable expanding or limiting the set of denominators accounted for as long as major
discontinuity points are eliminated.
∆Kj
∆xj
= S
(
∂Kj
∂xj
+
∂Kj
∂Kj−i
∆Kj−i
∆xj
)
+
∑
m∈M
S
(
∂Kj
∂Ki
∂Ki
∂Km
+
∂Kj
∂Km
)
∆Km
∆xj
(7)
∆Ki
∆xj
= S
∂Ki
∂Kj
(
∂Kj
∂xj
+
∂Kj
∂Kj−i
∆Kj−i
∆xj
)
+
∑
m∈M
S
(
∂Ki
∂Km
+
∂Ki
∂Kj
∂Ki
∂Km
)
∆Km
∆xj
(8)
The bracketed terms in the last expressions are symmetric so that it is natural to assume that they are the
same on average. Then, these two terms can be written as
∆Kj
∆xj
= a + M · x and ∆Ki
∆xj
= ∂Ki
∂Kj
a + M · x where
x = E
[
S
(
∂Ki
∂Km
+ ∂Ki
∂Kj
∂Ki
∂Km
)
∆Km
∆xj
]
, a =
(
∂Kj
∂xj
+
∂Kj
∂K
j
−i
∆K
j
−i
∆xj
)
and M is the number of common network members.
Suppose that we were able to observe
∆Kj
∆xj
and ∆Ki
∆xj
, then by controlling for M , we can identify x and combine
∆Kj
∆xj
and ∆Ki
∆xj
to recover ∂Ki
∂Kj
as before. Since K is not directly observable, pursuing the same exercise as before using
observable sheltering decisions E again requires the assumption that ∂f
∂xj
= 0.
21Assumption of
∂fj
∂Xj
= 0 eﬀectively eliminates the distinction between K and E˜ by ruling out the possibility that
Xj may have an impact on sheltering that is not interacting with behavior of others. In particular, it eliminates
the natural kind of heterogeneity where individuals are interacting using some variables K but the strength of their
response is determined by the value of Xj . In our context, Xj is likely to have an independent eﬀect because it
reﬂects eligibility for setting up a tax shelter that reduces the cost of acting for a particular individual  this
eﬀect is conceptually separate from, for example, increased awareness of the shelter and may inﬂuence behavior of
a taxpayer without aﬀecting others. If, on the other hand, a taxpayer aﬀects others via the decision to shelter only,
the assumption of
∂fj
∂Xj
= 0 would hold.
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Online appendix
Table A1: The eﬀect of crossing 10% ownership by a family network member on E-ﬁrm take up,
heterogeneity by dividend ownership of a network member
Everyone Above 10%
Range Dividends No dividends N Dividends No dividends N
[0.095, 0.105] 0.017 -0.018 1935 0.047 -0.044 1117
(0.033) (0.032) (0.056) (0.059)
[0.090, 0.110] 0.060** 0.021 3473 0.119** 0.033 1940
(0.028) (0.025) (0.048) (0.043)
[0.080, 0.120] 0.059*** 0.036** 6799 0.104*** 0.056* 3652
(0.021) (0.017) (0.036) (0.029)
[0.070, 0.130] 0.045*** 0.029** 10580 0.080*** 0.047** 5632
(0.017) (0.014) (0.030) (0.024)
[0.050, 0.150] 0.046*** 0.021* 18295 0.070*** 0.033* 9651
(0.013) (0.011) (0.023) (0.018)
Notes: The table shows interaction eﬀects of the treatment dummy with the dummies for the network member having/not
having dividends
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Table A2: The eﬀect of crossing 10% ownership by a family network member on E-ﬁrm take up 
timing eﬀects, everyone
∆p ∆ ln(p)
Range No controls Flexible No controls Flexible N
1-30 days 0.000 0.006 0.010 0.198 18295
(0.004) (0.006) (0.101) (0.216)
31-60 days 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.360*** 0.806*** 18295
(0.002) (0.004) (0.137) (0.302)
61-90 days 0.001 0.002** 0.279 0.755 18295
(0.001) (0.001) (0.239) (0.516)
91-120 days -0.001 -0.000 -0.387 -0.088 18295
(0.002) (0.003) (0.430) (1.081)
Network members with dividends in 2004
1-30 days 0.010* 0.014 0.302* 0.423 5822
(0.005) (0.011) (0.178) (0.375)
31-60 days 0.009*** 0.010* 0.499** 0.638 5822
(0.003) (0.006) (0.213) (0.485)
61-90 days 0.001 0.005** 0.227 1.177 5822
(0.002) (0.002) (0.367) (0.884)
91-120 days -0.001 -0.017 -0.310 -5.907* 5822
(0.002) (0.017) (0.782) (3.280)
Network members without dividends in 2004
1-30 days -0.005 0.003 -0.127 0.098 12473
(0.005) (0.008) (0.123) (0.260)
31-60 days 0.005* 0.016*** 0.283 0.905** 12473
(0.003) (0.005) (0.179) (0.372)
61-90 days 0.001 0.001 0.297 0.494 12473
(0.001) (0.001) (0.294) (0.603)
91-120 days -0.002 0.002 -0.407 0.735 12473
(0.002) (0.002) (0.553) (1.192)
Notes: Estimates of the eﬀect of probability of adopting in the given timing window before the reform, as a function of having
a network member with over 10% ownership (regression discontinuity, using (0.05,0.15) range)
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Table A3: The eﬀect of crossing 10% ownership by a family network member on E-ﬁrm take up 
cumulative timing eﬀects, everyone
∆p ∆ ln(p)
Range No controls Flexible No controls Flexible N
Overall 0.008* 0.024*** 0.127* 0.409*** 18295
(0.005) (0.008) (0.073) (0.158)
30+ days early 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.257** 0.623** 18295
(0.003) (0.005) (0.109) (0.247)
60+ days early 0.001 0.002 0.056 0.197 18295
(0.002) (0.004) (0.181) (0.425)
90+ days early -0.001 -0.002 -0.149 -0.267 18295
(0.002) (0.004) (0.267) (0.634)
Network members with dividends in 2004
Overall 0.021*** 0.028** 0.343*** 0.472* 5822
(0.007) (0.013) (0.122) (0.266)
30+ days early 0.011*** 0.013 0.381** 0.514 5822
(0.004) (0.008) (0.173) (0.399)
60+ days early 0.002 0.003 0.150 0.266 5822
(0.003) (0.006) (0.305) (0.693)
90+ days early 0.000 -0.006 0.053 -0.987 5822
(0.003) (0.008) (0.512) (1.053)
Network members without dividends in 2004
Overall 0.001 0.023** 0.019 0.398** 12473
(0.006) (0.009) (0.091) (0.192)
30+ days early 0.006 0.019*** 0.188 0.692** 12473
(0.004) (0.006) (0.141) (0.304)
60+ days early 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.175 12473
(0.003) (0.004) (0.232) (0.509)
90+ days early -0.002 -0.000 -0.229 -0.001 12473
(0.003) (0.005) (0.343) (0.734)
Notes: Estimates of the eﬀect of probability of adopting in the given timing window before the reform, as a function of having
a network member with over 10% ownership (regression discontinuity, using (0.05,0.15) range)
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Table A4: The eﬀect of crossing 10% ownership by a family network member on E-ﬁrm take up 
timing eﬀects, taxpayers with at least 10% shareholdings
∆p ∆ ln(p)
Range No controls Flexible No controls Flexible N
1-30 days 0.004 0.008 0.063 0.156 9651
(0.006) (0.012) (0.104) (0.228)
31-60 days 0.011** 0.024*** 0.304** 0.751** 9651
(0.004) (0.007) (0.138) (0.300)
61-90 days 0.002 0.004** 0.207 0.808 9651
(0.002) (0.002) (0.249) (0.532)
91-120 days -0.002 -0.001 -0.356 -0.097 9651
(0.003) (0.006) (0.435) (1.025)
Network members with dividends in 2004
1-30 days 0.018** 0.027 0.317* 0.502 3056
(0.009) (0.018) (0.184) (0.402)
31-60 days 0.014** 0.019 0.375* 0.593 3056
(0.007) (0.012) (0.217) (0.496)
61-90 days 0.003 0.007** 0.260 1.792* 3056
(0.003) (0.003) (0.395) (0.997)
91-120 days -0.001 -0.020 -0.152 -5.777* 3056
(0.004) (0.022) (0.801) (3.370)
Network members without dividends in 2004
1-30 days -0.004 0.000 -0.064 0.004 6595
(0.008) (0.015) (0.127) (0.271)
31-60 days 0.009 0.028*** 0.263 0.835** 6595
(0.006) (0.009) (0.178) (0.367)
61-90 days 0.001 0.002 0.162 0.316 6595
(0.002) (0.003) (0.300) (0.608)
91-120 days -0.003 0.004 -0.424 0.647 6595
(0.004) (0.004) (0.566) (1.015)
Notes: Estimates of the eﬀect of probability of adopting in the given timing window before the reform, as a function of having
a network member with over 10% ownership (regression discontinuity, using (0.05,0.15) range)
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Table A5: The eﬀect of crossing 10% ownership by a family network member on E-ﬁrm take up 
cumulative timing eﬀects, taxpayers with at least 10% shareholdings
∆p ∆ ln(p)
Range No controls Flexible No controls Flexible N
Overall 0.015* 0.038*** 0.129* 0.368** 9651
(0.008) (0.014) (0.073) (0.159)
30+ days early 0.011** 0.028*** 0.198* 0.571** 9651
(0.005) (0.009) (0.109) (0.244)
60+ days early -0.000 0.002 -0.024 0.137 9651
(0.004) (0.007) (0.186) (0.425)
90+ days early -0.003 -0.004 -0.236 -0.329 9651
(0.003) (0.009) (0.276) (0.610)
Network members with dividends in 2004
Overall 0.034*** 0.054** 0.309** 0.559* 3056
(0.012) (0.022) (0.126) (0.291)
30+ days early 0.016* 0.025* 0.294* 0.591 3056
(0.009) (0.014) (0.179) (0.428)
60+ days early 0.002 0.007 0.117 0.550 3056
(0.006) (0.008) (0.330) (0.799)
90+ days early -0.001 -0.008 -0.058 -0.856 3056
(0.005) (0.014) (0.557) (1.165)
Network members without dividends in 2004
Overall 0.004 0.032* 0.037 0.305 6595
(0.010) (0.017) (0.090) (0.187)
30+ days early 0.008 0.031*** 0.145 0.586** 6595
(0.007) (0.012) (0.140) (0.290)
60+ days early -0.002 0.000 -0.098 0.007 6595
(0.005) (0.009) (0.235) (0.478)
90+ days early -0.004 -0.002 -0.306 -0.126 6595
(0.005) (0.010) (0.355) (0.661)
Notes: Estimates of the eﬀect of probability of adopting in the given timing window before the reform, as a function of having
a network member with over 10% ownership (regression discontinuity, using (0.05,0.15) range)
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Figure A1: Distribution of ownership shares in 2004 around the 10% threshold
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Figure A2: Ownership share in 2004 and probability of ultimate adoption of the Transition E rule
 shareholding level, raw data including fractions
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Figure A3: Ownership share in 2004 and probability of ultimate adoption of the Transition E rule
 individual level, raw data including fractions
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Figure A4: Ownership share in 2004 and probability of ultimate adoption of the Transition E rule
 shareholding level
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Figure A5: Ownership share in 2004 and number of owners around the 10% threshold
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Figure A6: Ownership share in 2004 and log capital around the 10% threshold
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Figure A7: Ownership share in 2004 and gender around the 10% threshold
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Figure A8: Ownership share in 2004 and average age of shareholders around the 10% threshold
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Figure A9: Distribution of family member's ownership shares in 2004 around the 10% threshold
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Figure A10: Family member's ownership share in 2004 and number of owners around the 10%
threshold
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Figure A11: Family member's ownership share in 2004 and log capital around the 10% threshold
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Figure A12: Family member's ownership share in 2004 and average age of shareholders around the
10% threshold
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Figure A13: Family member's ownership share in 2004 and gender around the 10% threshold
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Figure A14: Ownership share in 2004 and probability of ultimate adoption of the Transition E rule
 individuals receiving dividends in 2004
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Figure A15: Ownership share in 2004 and probability of ultimate adoption of the Transition E rule
individuals not receiving dividends in 2004
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Figure A16: Ownership share in 2004 and probability of ultimate adoption of the Transition E rule
 ﬁrms with at most 1000 shares or no dividends realized in 2004
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Figure A17: Family member's ownership share in 2004 and number of individuals with at least 10%
share
l
l
l
l
l l l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Family member's ownership share
%
w
ith
 o
w
n
e
rs
hi
p 
sh
ar
e 
ab
ov
e
 1
0%
Online appendix page 14
Statistics Norway
Postal address:
PO Box 2633 St. Hanshaugen
NO-0131 Oslo
Oﬃ  ce address:
Akersveien 26, Oslo
Oterveien 23, Kongsvinger
E-mail: ssb@ssb.no
Internet: www.ssb.no
Telephone: + 47 62 88 50 00
ISSN: 1892-753X
D
esig
n
: Siri B
o
q
u
ist
